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Truths, Facts, and Liars 
PETER MARTON1 
ABSTRACT: A Moderate Anti-realist (MAR) approach to truth and meaning, built 
around the concept of knowability, will be introduced and argued for in this essay. Our 
starting point will be the two fundamental anti-realists principles that claim that neither 
truth nor meaning can outstrip knowability and our focus will be on the challenge of 
adequately formalizing these principles and incorporating them into a formal theory. 
Accordingly, I will introduce a MAR truth operator that is built on a distinction between 
being true and being factual. I will show then that this approach partitions propositions 
into eight classes, on the basis of their knowability. We will then ask the following 
question: Given the anti-realist principles, what kind of theory of propositional meaning 
can properly explain the meaninglessness of fully unknowable propositions? This ques-
tion will lead us to the claim that the meaning/content of propositions should be identi-
fied not with the set of possible worlds in which the propositions are true/factual, but 
rather in which they are known. This modified approach will then be used to analyze 
both the Liar Paradox and the Strengthened Liar. To anticipate the conclusion of this 
essay, it will be shown that a MAR framework can render definite truth and factuality 
values to the Liar sentence and it will also confirm our intuition that such paradoxical 
sentences are devoid of proper meaning. 
KEYWORDS: Chuch-Fitch paradox – knowability – Liar Paradox – meaning – moderate 
anti-realism – truth. 
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0. Introduction  
 One standard way of approaching a certain class of semantic paradoxes 
(as e.g. the Liar, the Knower, etc.) is to claim that the crucial sentence in 
the setup of the paradox is meaningless. This approach is not without prob-
lems: first, the crucial sentences in the setup of the paradoxes (e.g. “this 
sentence is false” or “this sentence is unknown”) do not seem to be mean-
ingless. Furthermore, pointing to self-reference as the source of meaning-
lessness is also problematic as many self-referential sentences (e.g. “this 
sentence is in English”) seem quite fine, and some of the semantic para-
doxes can be formalized without self-reference.2 
 Even if it is not without difficulties, and even if it may not be quite 
fashionable nowadays, this is the approach I will pursue in this essay. The 
main objective of the essay is to introduce, and argue for, a Moderate Anti-
Realist (MAR) framework, based on the verificationist/anti-realist princi-
ples that neither truth, nor meaning can outstrip knowability. I will start 
the first section with the Church-Fitch paradox that shows the limits of na-
ïve (or radical) anti-realism. As a response to the paradox, I will introduce 
a MAR truth operator that defines truth – at least partially – in terms of 
knowability. Some of the relevant logical features of this truth-definition 
will also be discussed in the first section, among them how truths are dif-
ferent from mere facts (or factual propositions) and how this definition par-
titions propositions into eight classes, on the basis of their knowability. 
This division will motivate the question we will ask in the fourth section 
of the essay: given our anti-realist principles, what theory of propositional 
meaning can accommodate to our expectations?  
 The point of introducing a formal truth operator on the one hand, and a 
possible world interpretation of propositional content/meaning, on the 
other hand, is not to prove that anti-realism holds. Rather, the point is that 
such an approach is an adequate and efficient tool to solve a set of semantic 
paradoxes and other challenges. 
 I will briefly discuss the basic assumptions our MAR framework relies 
on in the second section. The individuation of propositions as the sets of 
possible worlds in which the given propositions are true or factual, as well 
as the shortcomings of this particular approach, will be discussed in the 
                                                          
2  At least this is Yablo’s claim (Yablo 1993), although it is not without its detractors.  
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third section. The fourth section will focus on the challenge of attributing 
meaning or meaninglessness to fully unknowable propositions, and the fifth 
section will offer a solution to this challenge. I will argue that the set of 
possible worlds that correspond to the meaning/content of propositions 
should contain only those worlds in which the proposition is not only fac-
tual but known as well. 
 I will apply this MAR framework to the Liar Paradox and the Strength-
ened Liar in the last section of the paper. I will demonstrate that our MAR 
framework can assign definite truth and factuality value to the Liar sen-
tence, and that this truth/factuality assignment allows an explanation of the 
paradoxical nature of this sentence. I will suggest that the source of the 
paradox is that we try to attribute content/meaning to a sentence that is – 
given that it is unknowable – totally devoid of any meaning. 
1. The knowability paradox and the MAR definition of truth 
 The generally agreed upon central tenets of antirealism are that neither 
truth, nor meaning can outstrip knowability. Somewhat more formally: 
 (VTPinf) All truths are knowable, and 
 (VMPinf) All meaningful propositions are knowable. 
 We will focus on the first of these principles in this section and return 
to the second one in the fourth section of this essay. The simplest, most 
straightforward way of formalizing VTPinf is: 
 (VTP)  ⊢ ∀p(p → ◊Kp), 
where the operator, K, should be read as “it is known that…”.3 The lesson 
of the Church-Fitch paradox (Fitch 1963), however, is that this straightfor-
ward formalization is inadequate. The paradox shows that, if – besides VTP 
– the factivity of knowledge and closure under conjunction-elimination in 
                                                          
3  More formally, Ks,tp is the operator that “the epistemic agent, s, knows that p at 
time, t.” Then we can get the above K by generalizing over subjects (epistemic agents) 
and times: Kp ↔ ∃s∃tKs,tp 
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K are also granted,4 then true propositions are not only knowable, but 
known as well: 
 (CFP)  ⊢ ∀p(p ↔ Kp), 
 At the heart of the paradox is the following type of propositions: 
 (NC)  p & ¬Kp, 
i.e. p is an unknown fact. While most of us would agree without hesitation 
that there are unknown facts, it is impossible to single out any of them and 
hence it is unknowable that a fact is unknown. 
 Another problem with VTP is that it provides only a necessary, but not 
a sufficient condition for truth, as the converse of VTP, 
 (VTPconv)  ⊢ ◊Kp → p, 
does not hold, given that knowability (◊Kp) is arguably not a factive.5 
Without a sufficient condition, however, there is a theoretical gap between 
knowability and truth – the epistemic-metaphysical element that would dif-
ferentiate between these two concepts is missing.  
 One way to prevent the paradox, as I argued elsewhere (Marton 2006), 
is to revise the knowability principles (VTP and VTPconv) in the following 
way: 
                                                          
4  Formally: ⊢∀p(Kp → p) for factivity, and ⊢∀p(K(p&q)→(Kp&Kq)) for conjun-
ction-elimination. Then, here is how the paradox goes: assume, for any arbitrary p, that 
it is an unknown fact, i.e. p & ¬Kp. If so, then it is knowable (by VTP), and so ◊K(p & 
¬Kp). Then, in some possible world, K(p&¬Kp). Given that knowledge is closed under 
conjunction-introduction, Kp & K¬Kp also holds. So, given that K is a factive, a con-
tradiction can be derived, and so we can discharge the assumption. Thus, it is ¬(p & 
¬Kp), for any p, i.e. ⊢∀p(p → Kp) holds. Given that K is factive, we can swiftly derive 
that ⊢∀p(p ↔ Kp). 
5  While the factivity of VTPconv was accepted and argued for in the recent past, this 
principle now seems to be abandoned. See, e.g., Tennant’s retraction, for the record 
(Tennant 2009, 225). Furthermore, even if one does accept the converse knowability 
principle, ⊢◊Kp→p, it leads to further paradoxes, as e.g. the modal collapse (⊢ 
p↔◊Kp), if S4 is also granted (Williamson 1992). 
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 (MART) ⊢ Tp ↔ (p&◊Kp), 
where T is a moderate anti-realist truth operator. This definition intro-
duces a distinction between truths and facts: while an unknown fact is in-
deed a fact, it is not a truth, as it is outside of our epistemic reach.  
 Truth, according to this definition, is essentially two-pronged: the sec-
ond, epistemic part, ◊Kp, expresses its anti-realist ideals: truths are more 
than just facts out there; truths are essentially for us, epistemic agents. The 
first part, however, acknowledges that truths are not entirely within our 
realms – at the end, they are determined by how the world is. This, of 
course, is what “moderates” the anti-realist character of truth. Alterna-
tively, truth is neither purely metaphysical/ontological, nor it is purely ep-
istemic; these two aspects cannot be reduced to either one of them. 
 Introducing the MAR truth operator obviously preempts the Church-
Fitch paradox as NC type sentences, i.e. sentences in the form: p & ¬Kp, 
are not knowable, and so they are not true either. Our MAR interpretation 
of VTPinf recognizes that this principle is about truths, and not facts in gen-
eral.   
 In light of these insights, I will refer to propositions that hold in a given 
world as being factual, preserving the term “true” for propositions in the 
extension of our newly introduced operator, T. Obviously, all true propo-
sitions are factual, however not all factual propositions are true:6 consider 
an unknown contingent statement, p; then, exactly one of the following two 
conjunctions must be factual as well: (i) p&¬Kp or (ii) ¬p&¬K¬p. But 
neither of them is knowable as they are NC-type propositions. Thus, some 
factuals are not true. The logic of factuals is the standard 2-valued classical 
logic where e.g. p ∨ ¬p is a theorem.  
 The logic of truths, however, is different. First, we can introduce the 
concept of falsity, mirroring the definition of truth, as follows: 
 (Def-F) ⊢ Fp ↔ (¬p & ◊K¬p). 
We can also notice that  
                                                          
6  In other words, MART restricts capture while accepts release without any further 
ado.  
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 ⊢ Fp ↔ T¬p, 
as it can be expected. Given that certain propositions are neither true nor 
false, this system is a 3-valued logic embedded in the more general, biva-
lent system of factuals. 
 We can even go one step further: the concepts of truth and falsity were 
constructed from 3 logically independent elements: a proposition, p; its 
knowability, ◊Kp; and the knowability of its negation, ◊K¬p. From these 
three ingredients we can manufacture eight different classes of proposi-
tions:7 
 (i)  two classes for true propositions, i.e. propositions that are factual 
and their factuality is knowable:  
 propositions that satisfy p & ◊Kp & ◊K¬p, or 
 propositions that satisfy p & ◊Kp & ¬◊K¬p. 
 (ii)  two for false propositions, i.e. propositions that are non-factual 
and their non-factuality is knowable: 
 propositions that satisfy ¬p & ◊Kp & ◊K¬p, or  
 propositions that satisfy ¬p & ¬◊Kp & ◊K¬p. 
 (iii) the remaining four for the 3rd value propositions, i.e. proposi-
tions whose (non-) factuality is unknowable: 
 propositions that satisfy p & ¬◊Kp & ◊K¬p, or 
 propositions that satisfy p & ¬◊Kp & ¬◊K¬p, or 
 propositions that satisfy ¬p & ◊Kp & ¬◊K¬p, or 
 propositions that satisfy ¬p & ¬◊Kp & ¬◊K¬p.8  
                                                          
7  Belnap (1977, 47) considers a structurally similar eightfold division of propositions 
that also combines epistemic and ontological aspects in a similar way. 
8  There is another way to group these eight basic types:  
 (i) two of them are not only contingent, but epistemically contingent, i.e. both p 
and ¬p are knowable (propositions that satisfy p &◊ Kp & ◊K¬p and ¬p & 
◊Kp & ◊K¬p).  
 (ii) Two of them are epistemically undisputable i.e. they are true (or false) but 
their negation cannot be known ((p & ◊Kp & ¬◊K¬p and ¬p & ¬◊Kp & ◊K¬p) 
– necessary statements definitely do belong to this category, but arguably 
there are other propositions in this category as well.  
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We will soon ask: What kind of theory of propositional meaning can ade-
quately render meaninglessness to fully unknowable propositions, i.e. to 
propositions that satisfy p & ¬◊Kp & ¬◊K¬p or ¬p & ¬◊Kp & ¬◊K¬p? 
2. Basic Assumptions 
 We have to pause at this point in our investigation to address the basic 
underlying assumptions of our approach. First, we assume that only stand-
ard possible worlds (i.e. worlds without contradictions or value gaps) are 
in the set of all possible worlds. We will follow Kripke’s approach (Kripke 
1980), according to which possible worlds are not discovered, but rather 
stipulated. 
 Second, I will take S5 to be the relevant modal system (containing ex-
actly one equivalence class). This choice gives us the comfort of equating 
possibility with being true/factual in at least one possible world without 
further specifying the accessibility relation. 
 Third, the relevant modality to be considered here is logical possibility 
and necessity. This choice of modality is forced upon us by our inquiries 
into the concept of meaning in the next sections of the essay; to properly 
represent the content of propositions, all possible worlds (not only those 
within some narrower concepts of modality such as nomological or meta-
physical) must be considered. Arguably, however, the scope of modality is 
effectively narrowed by our use of the knowledge operator, K, as this op-
erator is limited to (our kind of) epistemic agents.  
 Fourth, our MAR definition of truth requires a robust concept of 
knowledge. Unless this theoretical concept of knowledge strongly overlaps 
with our pre-theoretical, practical concept of knowledge, the truth defini-
tion has little use. This concept of knowledge should cover empirical, as 
well as theoretical knowledge, etc. I also take it for granted that an agent’s 
knowing a proposition, p, implies its factuality (and so, its truth), and that 
                                                          
 (iii) Two of these types are epistemically disputable or falsifiable (p & ¬◊Kp & 
◊K¬p and ¬p & ◊Kp & ¬◊K¬p); while their factuality cannot be known, if 
they were non-factual, then their non-factuality could be known (p & ¬◊Kp 
& ◊K¬p and ¬p& ◊Kp & ¬◊K¬p). 
 (iv) Finally, two of these classes are fully unknowable (p & ¬◊Kp & ¬◊K¬p and 
¬p & ¬◊Kp & ¬◊K¬p).  
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p is believed by the agent. A third condition involving some kind of justi-
fication, reason, or evidence is also assumed. It may be objected that this 
assumption is overly optimistic as we have no generally accepted, adequate 
theory of knowledge. But this criticism conflates two different issues; 
namely, the lack of a theory for a concept with the viability of the concept 
itself. 
 Fifth, this essay will avoid treating the concept of knowledge as an es-
sentially modal concept, and accordingly, the knowledge operator, K, as a 
modal operator. In other words, this essay will not utilize the nowadays 
popular, formal 2-dimensional approaches, where knowing p in a given 
world is essentially a function of whether or not p is true in the epistemo-
logically accessible worlds. These formal models, no doubt, have their rel-
evance in certain epistemological investigations. But those models also 
come with their own limitations and problems (e.g. that any necessary 
proposition is known, according to the modal interpretation of the 
knowledge operator). It is also rather doubtful whether these models are 
consistent with the basic ideals of anti-realism. 
 Finally, knowledge claims (i.e. that s knows that p at t, Ks,tp, and the 
more generalized form, it is known that p, Kp) are epistemic facts, and as 
such they are parts, or constituents of possible worlds, and can be expressed 
by propositions. In other words, epistemic facts are facts, and the corre-
sponding propositions can be individuated the same way as any other prop-
ositions, i.e. by the corresponding set of possible worlds. 
3. On the meaning/content of propositions 
 It is generally accepted in certain philosophical circles that propositions 
can be individuated and differentiated by the sets of possible worlds in 
which the corresponding propositions are factual. If two propositions, p1 
and p2, have different truth (or rather, factuality) values in at least one pos-
sible world, then the two propositions are indeed different. However, if 
there is no such world, then p1 and p2 are just two instances of the same 
proposition. 
 By identifying propositions with sets of worlds, the meaning of these 
propositions is intended to be captured. Indeed, one way to understand 
propositions – which amounts to capturing their meanings – is to ask: in 
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what circumstances is this proposition true/factual9 and in what circum-
stances is it false/non-factual?  
 This way of identifying the meaning of propositions is not without dif-
ficulties. First, there is the threat of circularity: we define the meaning of a 
particular proposition by referencing some relevant situations which, one 
can presume, are identified by some other propositions. But those situation-
describing propositions (or, truth and falsity conditions) must be individu-
ated and interpreted in some way10 and that seems impossible to do without 
referencing – sooner or later – the particular propositions we have started 
with. However, even if defining meaning this way is circular, it does not 
necessarily mean that it is viciously so.11 
 Second, differentiating propositions by sets of possible worlds results 
in the fact that there is exactly one necessary proposition. Still, even if a 
formal individuation leads to the outcome that there should be only one 
necessary proposition, there should be some differentiation among its in-
stances, according to their differing meanings. To wit, the proposition that 
“if you don’t stand for anything, then you don’t stand for anything” means 
something entirely different than the proposition that “two plus two equals 
four.” This problem, the problem of hyperintensionality12 is outside of the 
scope of this essay – but it definitely motivates the position about the mean-
ing of propositions I will argue for. 
 Finally, as I have indicated earlier, the meaning/content of fully un-
knowable proposition is also problematic. What is the relevance of differ-
entiating two propositions if both are unknowable to us? Alternatively, our 
                                                          
9  Given that our preferred modal system is S5, the difference between being true and 
being factual plays any role only if the proposition is fully unknowable. If a proposition 
is known in at least one possible world, then the proposition is true in all those possible 
worlds in which it is factual. As the issue of fully unknowable propositions will be 
considered soon in some length, the distinction will be downplayed here. 
10  This is the result of our dependence on Kripke’s take on the ontological status of 
possible worlds – or at least of the way I interpret his claim.  
11  To substantiate this point, a Quinean argument for the primacy of theory over the 
individual sentences may be handy here. And surely, advocates of coherence theories 
of truth and/or of knowledge (e.g. Davidson 1986), can also help here. However, this 
issue has little significance for our project and so it will not be pursued on these pages. 
12  On this problem, see e.g. Jago (2014). 
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MAR approach is built – at least partially – on the idea that meaning should 
not outstrip knowability. In light of this consideration, we may ask: what 
kind of theory of meaning can accommodate to this anti-realist expecta-
tion?  
4. On the meaning of unknowable propositions 
 Let us consider a fully unknowable, contingent proposition, p. This 
proposition, like any other, can be individuated by the set of possible 
worlds in which p is factual. But what content/meaning does p have? As 
mentioned earlier, identifying meaning with the set of possible worlds ap-
peals to our intuition that the meaning of propositions can be grasped by 
the situations in which they are true, and the situations in which they are 
false. Ideally, we could assemble a list of propositions, p1, …, pn such that 
(p1 & p2 & … pn) ↔ p. This list of propositions, p’s truth conditions, would 
then explicate the meaning of p. Given that this biconditional, (p1 & p2 & … 
pn) ↔ p, fixes the meaning of p, it should hold not only in the actual world, 
but in every possible world as well. 
  One may find it more natural to identify a given proposition not with 
the conjunction, but rather the disjunction of a set of propositions. As I see 
it, both options are viable, but they are motivated by very different consid-
erations. The latter option envisions the identification of a proposition, p, 
with listing all the possible scenarios in which p is factual. Accordingly, 
each disjunct is a detailed description of a possible world (or perhaps a 
narrowly defined situation, i.e. a “small” set of possible worlds). The for-
mer option, more fitting for an anti-realist approach, looks for defining cri-
teria, such that each criterion is necessary, and they are jointly sufficient as 
well. Actually, we have already utilized this approach earlier, when we de-
fined or identified the concept, or rather the meaning, of truth with two 
individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions: factuality and 
knowability. Similarly, the traditional justified true belief approach to 
knowledge that we listed among our assumptions in the previous section 
also follows this pattern.13 
                                                          
13  Propositions can, and perhaps should, be identified by sets of propositions. There 
are two different strategies to identify sets: either by listing their elements, or by giving 
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 In practice, we would probably settle for less: we would describe a sce-
nario (i.e. a collection of worlds) in which p is true and another scenario 
(i.e. another collection of worlds) in which p is false. These scenarios can 
be described by sets of propositions, q1, q2, …, ql and r1, r2, …, rm and then 
we would claim that (q1 & q2 & … & ql) → p and (r1 & r2 & … & rm) → 
¬p. These two sets represent the truth and falsity conditions of p – hereafter 
the T&F conditions. Intuitively, the problem is that if p and ¬p are unknow-
able, then so are the T&F conditions that meant to explicate them. But how 
can we grasp the meaning of a proposition if it is couched in descriptions 
that are themselves unknowable? Of course, the meaning of the proposi-
tions constituting the lists can be further explained by further sets of lists, 
but the same must hold true: some of those propositions on those lists must 
also be unknowable, and so on.14 
 To support our intuition, I will briefly argue first that if the T&F condi-
tions are known, then p cannot be unknowable. Then we will consider in 
what ways these conditions themselves can be unknowable. The two con-
ditionals, presenting a conceptual analysis for the meaning of p, are ana-
lytic as they explicate meanings and they are obviously known in our world. 
There are two ways these conditionals can fail to transfer knowledge from 
T&F conditions to p:  
 (i)  in all the possible worlds where the world-describing T&F con-
ditions are actually known, the conditionals themselves are not 
known, or  
 (ii)  although the conditionals themselves are known, but epistemic 
closure does not hold. Neither of these options are reasonable, 
though. 
                                                          
rules. The former corresponds to the disjunctive approach, while the latter to our pre-
ferred approach of using conjunctions. 
14  Let me acknowledge two possible, highly connected, objections – at least in a fo-
otnote – which will not be discussed here. First, one may object that there are no unkno-
wable facts, i.e. all facts are within our epistemic reach. Second, that even if there are 
unknowable facts, there are no unknowable propositions to express them. As I do not 
think that these objections are reasonable, they will not be discussed here.  
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 Considering the former option, we may ask: is there any reason to as-
sume that in all the possible worlds where the T&F conditions, (q1, q2, …, 
ql) and (r1, r2, …, rm), are fully known, the analytic conditionals, (q1 & q2 
& … & ql) → p and (r1 & r2 & … & rm) → ¬p, known in our own actual 
world, would not, or rather could not, be known (at any time, by any epis-
temic agent)? Since these conditionals are true in any world, it is either the 
belief or the justification/evidence condition that can prevent putative 
knowers from knowing them. If so, then there must be some inherent, 
structural difference between our world in which these knowledge condi-
tions are met and the worlds in which the T&F conditions are known to 
account for the difference in knowing the analytic conditionals. But, as far 
as I can see, there is no such inherent difference. 
 Turning our attention now to the latter option, these conditionals can 
fail to transmit knowability only if epistemic closure itself is challenged: 
these challenges operate with a familiar line of reasoning, summarized in a 
conditional, against a non-standard, unexpected circumstance (Dretske’s 
zebra-looking mules, etc.). But our conceptual analysis does not fit into this 
pattern – it outlines the very circumstance in which the analyzed concept 
must be true. If both the T&F conditions are knowable and the analytic 
conditionals are known, then transmitting knowability is unavoidable.15 
 Accordingly, if p is unknowable, then the set of T&F conditions must 
also be unknowable. There are 3 different ways these T&F conditions can 
be unknowable: 
 (i)  The set of T&F conditions is inconsistent, and so the conditionals 
are vacuously true and p and ¬p may be propositions out of our 
epistemic reach. 
 (ii)  Even if the T&F set is consistent, some of the elements of the 
sets can be unknowable themselves, and that accounts for the un-
knowability of p. 
                                                          
15  This claim may come with a caveat. It may be objected that even if both K(q1 & q2 
… & ql) and K((q1 & q2 … & ql) → p) hold, epistemic agents may never actually attain 
the knowledge of q. That’s certainly possible, i.e. there will be possible worlds in which 
p will not be actually known. But if closure holds, then attaining the knowledge of p is 
also possible, i.e. there will be possible worlds in which p is known. And that is enough 
for our purposes. 
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 (iii)  Even if the set of T&F conditions is consistent, and all the prop-
ositions in this set are knowable in themselves, their conjunctions 
may still not be knowable, i.e. the situation they describe are not 
fully knowable. NC, the sentence at the heart of the Church-Fitch 
hypothesis is an example of such conjunctions where both sen-
tences can be knowable separately, but the conjunction itself is 
arguably unknowable. Importantly, this option undermines the 
compositionality of meaning – even if two propositions, p and q, 
both have meanings, p&q may not be knowable and thus the con-
junction is meaningless.16 
 To sum it up, unknowable propositions cannot be explicated/illumi-
nated/interpreted in terms of knowable propositions. They are meaningless, 
as they are beyond our epistemic reach. As these propositions may be in-
dividuated by a corresponding set of possible worlds, we can further con-
clude that meanings cannot be identified with the sets of possible worlds in 
which the proposition is factual, even in case of contingent propositions. 
5. A solution to the problem 
 The insights of the previous section suggest that we should refine our 
intuition about the individuation and meaning of propositions by modify-
ing our previous question in the following way: in what knowable circum-
stances would a proposition be known to be true, and in what knowable 
circumstances would a proposition be known to be false? Accordingly, we 
                                                          
16  Jago writes: “Take our example from above, ‘it is both snowing and not snowing 
here right now’. This sentence is perfectly meaningful, for both of its conjuncts are 
meaningful, and a sentence ‘A ∧ B’ is meaningful whenever its conjuncts ‘A’ and ‘B’ 
are individually meaningful” (Jago 2014, 7). Jago’s claim about the compositionality of 
meaning comes without any argument or support. However, just because one un-
derstands the meaning of the proposition “it’s snowing here right now,” claiming that 
the proposition that “it is both snowing and not snowing here right now” has any mea-
ning is far from obvious. Personally, I cannot imagine what would anyone aimed to 
express by that proposition. Furthermore, it is unclear how the meaning of this propo-
sition is different from “Boston is in Massachusetts, but Boston is not in Massachu-
setts.” 
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identify the meaning of a proposition not with the set of worlds in which 
the proposition is factual, but rather with the set of worlds in which the 
proposition is known. Informally, this approach emphasizes the relevance 
of context – the meaning of a proposition, p, is captured by considering 
what else should be known to understand p.17 
 In essence, our MAR approach suggests two different identity relations 
on the set of propositions. In one way, propositions can be individuated by 
the sets of worlds in which they are factual. In another way, the con-
tent/meaning of propositions can be identified with set of possible worlds 
in which the proposition is known. These two different identity relations 
correspond to our two different concepts of truth; the metaphysical concept 
(our concept of factuality) and the epistemically constrained MAR concept 
(our concept of truth). 
 To be more precise, it is not propositions, but rather pairs of proposi-
tions to which meaning is attributed. In the traditional account, individuat-
ing p with the corresponding set of worlds also individuates ¬p, as its cor-
responding set is the complement set. Accordingly, the meaning of the pair 
of propositions, p and ¬p (or rather, Tp and Fp) should be identified with 
the set of worlds in which p is known and with the set of worlds in which 
¬p is known. Quite obviously, this approach solves our problem. If p and 
¬p are both unknown in every possible world (i.e. p is a fully unknowable 
proposition), then the corresponding sets are empty and so no meaning is 
associated with p (and ¬p). It also explains in what sense truth is more than 
mere factuality – being true is being meaningfully factual. 
6. The Liar Paradox 
 Let us turn our attention now to the Liar Paradox. Consider first the 
following sentence: 
                                                          
17  This point suggests how this approach can solve the problem of hyperintensiona-
lity. What defines the meaning of a necessary statement is the set of worlds in which 
that statement is known. Focusing on those worlds would reveal what should have to 
be known previously to be able to know that p. This approach is rather similar to the 
intuitionistic ideal of stages, or possible development, of knowledge (Beall 2003, 96-
97). 
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 (f)  This sentence is false. 
Traditionally, this sentence can be formalized as  
 (1)  f↔¬f, 
and then it is easy to realize that no truth value can be attributed to f. This 
point, on its own, invites us to consider some version of a 3-valued (or 
many-valued) logic. The trap can be easily avoided if a 3rd value is at-
tributed to both f and ¬f. Still, some explanation is required about the mean-
ing of the 3rd truth value, i.e. what it means for a proposition to be neither 
true nor false.  
 Consider now the following, “strengthened” version of the paradox: 
 (n)  This sentence is not true. 
It is often claimed that the previous approach, based on a 3rd truth value, is 
inefficient here. If n is neither true, nor false, then obviously n is not true, so 
the sentence that “n is not true” is true and so we are back at the paradox. We 
may anticipate at this point that this conclusion is just too fast; all we should 
be able to conclude from this reasoning is that “n is not true” is factual. 
 Let us now switch from the traditional approach to our MAR approach. 
The previously introduced sentence, f, can be written as 
 (2)  f ↔ Ff, 
Where F is our falsity operator. Since (2) fixes the meaning of the sentence 
referenced as f, it is an analytic statement and so 
 (3)  □(f ↔ Ff). 
Given that Ff is defined as ¬f & ◊K¬f, what (3) really amounts to is 
 (4)  □(f ↔ (¬f & ◊K¬f)). 
As f and ¬f&◊K¬f cannot be simultaneously factual, (4) can only be true 
if both are nonfactual. Accordingly, f must be non-factual, and so ¬f must 
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be factual, but then ◊K¬f cannot be factual. Putting all these considerations 
together, 4 implies that  
 (5)  □(¬f & ¬◊K¬f). 
Furthermore, according to 5, ¬f is factual in all possible worlds and thus f 
is not knowable either: 
 (6)  □(¬f & ¬◊Kf & ¬◊K¬f). 
 Less formally, the crucial sentence in the liar paradox is, on the one 
hand, nonfactual, but, on the other hand, it is also fully unknowable, and so 
meaningless.18  
 Similarly, the formal version of the “strengthened” liar sentence is 
 (7)  □(n ↔ ¬Tn), 
and then, by using the definition of T:  
 (8)  □(n ↔ ¬(n & ◊Kn)). 
Following a reasoning similar to our previous one shows that (8) implies 
that 
 (9)  □(n & ¬◊Kn & ¬◊K¬n). 
(9) shows that the crucial sentence of the strengthened liar is factual, but, 
just like the liar, it is also fully unknowable,19 and so meaningless.  
                                                          
18  Even if we know f's (non-) factuality (that it holds in none of the possible worlds), 
f itself is unknown to us. This point brings to the front one of the basic tenets of antire-
alism: knowledge of meaning is knowledge of truth conditions. Knowing the factivity 
of a proposition is not the same as knowing its meaning, or, simply put, knowing the 
proposition itself. 
19  Here is the reason: assume that the sentence within the scope of the necessity ope-
rator, n & ¬◊Kn & ¬◊K¬n, is knowable. Then there is a world, w, in which K(n & ¬◊Kn 
& ¬◊K¬n) is factual/true. Assuming that K is closed under conjunction-elimination, 
both Kn and K¬◊Kn would hold in that world. Given that K is factive, ¬◊Kn (i.e. □¬Kn) 
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 Our outcomes, (6) and (9), show that the MAR definitions of truth and 
falsity render definite factuality and truth values to the liar and strength-
ened liar sentences. The former is unknowably nonfactual, while the latter 
is unknowably factual; as such, neither of them is either true or false.  
 Our language is limited by the logical/epistemic norm that sentences 
should be meaningful. Any assertion in the form that “p is factual” should 
be interpreted as p is meant to be meaningfully factual, which, according 
to our interpretation means that p is meant to be true. If so, then the distinc-
tions between untrue and false and, similarly, between true and unfalse dis-
appear when we consider assertions. False and untrue sentences differ in 
their knowability and no one should aim to assert a proposition that’s un-
knowable, and thus, according to our reasoning, meaningless. The differ-
ence between these sentences surfaces only as an explanatory device: they 
explain one’s mistake to assert something that should not or could not be 
asserted. Arguably, this is an important advantage of this approach: the dis-
tinction between truth and factuality is almost imperceptible – in most of 
our everyday (and perhaps even in our theoretical) dealings truth and fac-
tuality are the same. The consequence of this insight is that the two liar 
paradoxes collapse into one; if there is no real, meaningful difference be-
tween the assertions that “this sentence is false” and that “this sentence is 
untrue” then these assertions express the same proposition that can be ex-
pressed, using the combination of our previous formulations, (6) and (9), 
as follows: 
 (10) □((f & ¬◊Kf & ¬◊K¬f) ∨ (¬f & ¬◊Kf & ¬◊K¬f)). 
In other words, the proposition that expresses the liar-sentence is the staple 
meaningless sentence which is either untruly factual or unfalsely nonfac-
tual. 
 Furthermore, our insight about the normative character of assertions 
prevents the emergence of an “iterated” liar paradox. In light of our previ-
ous insights about the normative standards governing assertions, the sen-
tence that 
                                                          
would also hold in that world, and so would ¬Kn then. Given that both Kn and ¬Kn 
would both hold in w, n & ¬◊Kn & ¬◊K¬n is not knowable.  
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 (g)  this sentence is nonfactual, 
should be interpreted as “this sentence is meaningfully nonfactual”, i.e. it 
is false. But then we are back at the original liar paradox. 
7. Concluding remarks 
 The underlying, fundamental assumption of this paper is that the con-
cept of knowledge plays a central role in our concepts of truth and meaning. 
It is the possibility of knowing that makes truth (understood as being dif-
ferent than mere factuality) and meaning possible for us, epistemic agents. 
I did not argue for this fundamental assumption in this essay. Rather, I ar-
gued that such a moderate anti-realist approach to the concepts of truth and 
meaning offers a way of solving or dissolving a number of semantic para-
doxes and other challenges. I demonstrated that our MAR approach to truth 
and meaning, offers an interpretation of the Liar and Strengthened Liar 
sentences. This interpretation renders definite truth and factuality values to 
these sentences and shows that the difference between their truth and fac-
tuality values emerge from their meaninglessness. Even if these sentences 
do not seem to be meaningless, they are meaningless as there is no possible 
situation in which these sentences (or their negations) could be known. This 
should not surprise us: if someone tells us that the sentence she is uttering 
is false (or it is not true), then we would not know what she meant by it, 
what kind of knowable fact she tried to impart to us.  
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